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HusBAND AND WIFE-ANTENUPTIAL CoNTRACTs-Prior to the
enactment of the statute of uses the wife's dower could not be bargained
away.1 Thus dower constituted a clog upon alienation. Antenuptial
contracts therefore were not recognized. However, with the passing

1 For ·a study of the history of antenuptial contracts, see Gibson v. Gibson, 15
Mass. 106 (1818); Rieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33, II5 N.W. 560 (1908); Logan
v. Phillips, 18 Me. 22 (1853), where the court said that the reason for the commonlaw rule lay in the fact that the settlement having been executed prior to marriage, no
dower existed, and that no right can be barred before it accrues. A well-considered
historical review may be found in Ronken, "Antenuptial Contracts: Their Origin and
Nature," 24 YALE L. ]. 65 (1914).
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of the statute of uses, jointures came into existence as means of barring
dower and making alienation free. Jointures were of two kinds, viz.,
legal and equitable.2 As the law developed in England both types were
recognized; but as the law developed in the United States, statutes
were enacted specifically providing for jointures and antenuptial contracts. 8 Our courts generally considered them as equitable in nature.
These early statutes enacted by the various states were modeled after
the statute of Henry VIII,4 which enacted that where lands are settled
to the use of the wife, "then in every such case, every woman married
having such jointure ... shall not claim nor have title to have any
dower in the residue."
The value of jointures lay in the fact that they were a protection
for the wife since under the statute the wife was possessed of a present
interest, whereas under the common law the wife_ would have been
compelled to file an action for her dower.5 Today, however, the use
of the antenuptial contract, which is the outgrowth of a jointure, is not
so much to protect the intended wife, as it is to protect the intended
2 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136 (1756). Before the statute of uses, the wife
could have no dower in land conveyed to the use of the husband because he had no
seisin thereof. Consequently, it was the custom to make a separate settlement before
marriage for the husband and wife in joint tenancy or "jointure." After the statute
of uses, the wife would have had this property and dower in her husband's other
property as well had not express provision been made barring dower where there was
a jointure. In addition to jointures expressly within the terms, of the statute, equity
recognized certain other types (such as contracts by infants) as barring dower. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 537 (1939).
An example of an attempted antenuptial contract is found in the English case
of Druey v. Druey, 2 Eden 39, 28 Eng. Rep. 810 (1762), where a minor, prior to
marriage, contracted to accept a provision in lieu of dower. The court held that this
was not a contract, but merely a provision wherefore dower was barred. Ordinarily,
however, the provision would not constitute a legal bar of dower. The English court
took the equitable concept that a wife could not have her provision and dower too. At
Jaw thi~ decision would have been impossible.
8 A collection of statutes is found in 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws, §§
196, 197 (1935). Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1938), § 10502 (2), provides: "The conveyance of an estate or interest in real property, to a person in lieu of dower, to take
effect on the death of the grantor, if accepted by the grantee, will bar the grantee's
right of dower in the real property of the grantor."
1
Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13081, provides: "A woman may also be barred
• of her dower in all the· lands of her husband by a jointure settled on her with her
assent before the marriage, provided such jointure consists of a freehold estate in lands
for the life of the wife at least, to take effect in possession or profit immediately on
the death of the husband."
4 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10, § 6 (1535).
5 Grogan v. Garrison, 27 Ohio St. 50 (1875), a very well-considered case involving an early jointure statute in Ohio. It is interesting to observe that the early
Ohio cases have generally upheld these equitable jointures. Mintier v. Mintier, 28
Ohio St. 307 (1876); Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
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husband's heirs or children of a prior wife, or to protect the property
from the intended wife herself. The use of the antenuptial contract
is now often abused. It is apparent then why the courts have sought so
jealously to protect the wife's interests. The body of law relative to
antenuptial contracts has yielded the following general rules:
(a) Antenuptial contracts are greatly favored by the courts
except when they are used as an instrument of fraud or include
matters against public policy.
(b) These contracts must be in writ:ing under the statute of
frauds.
( c) As between parties engaged to marry, a confidential relationship arises that is jealously guarded by the courts.
(d) The antenuptial contract must be fair, just, reasonable
and adequate.
( e) Disclosure of the nature, value and extent of the prospective husband's property is essential.
These rules will be discussed in order except for the second, which
is obvious, since an antenuptial contract is an agreement in consideration
of marriage.
Public Policy
Before proceeding further, it may be well to define the modern
antenuptial contract. In Matter of Carnevale 6 the court defines an
antenuptial contract as an agreement "between a man and woman before marriage, but in contemplation and generally in consideration of
marriage whereby the property rights and interests of either the prospective husband, or wife, or both of them, are determined, or where
property is secured to either or both of them, or to their children."
This contract is variously known as "marriage settlement," "prenuptial
contract," or "antenuptial contract."
Since marriage is the foundation of our civilized structure, society
has an interest in these antenuptial contracts. Prenuptial agreements
are generally favored because they tend to promote domestic peace and
happiness. 7 However, they are void if they offend public policy. Thus
where a prospective wife waived her rights to any homestead, the
agreement was held invalid.8 Likewise agreements which provide for
property settlement in anticipation of future separation or divorce,9
248 App. Div. 63 at 65, 289 N.Y.S. 185 (1936).
Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846).
8 Swingle v. Swingle, 36 N.D. 6II, 162 N.W. 912 (1917).
9 Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W. (2d) 783 (1928); Williams v.
Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Cumming v. Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 102
S.E. 572 (1920), where a contract provided for payment of alimony on separation or
divorce; Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916).
6

7
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or for waiver by the wife of her right of support,1° have been considered
void. Many cases have arisen where the parties have married to legitimatize a child and in contemplation of divorce have executed an antenuptial contract. The courts have unanimously held these agreements
illegal and void as against public policy.11

Confidential Relationship
The prospective husband and wife entering into an antenuptial contract stand in such a confidential relationship that the courts will protect
it with jealousy. As a lower Ohio court said in Speckman v. Speckman,12 "The relation existing between persons who have entered into
an agreement to marry is of a confidential character" and the courts
"will carefully scrutinize all such contracts to see if they are fair in
their terms and provisions for the wife and were entered into by such
wife with full and complete knowledge of all the facts and of her rights
in the premises." Likewise the Ohio Supreme Court said, in the case
of Juhasz v. Juhasz: 18 "An engagement to marry creates a confidential
relation between the contracting parties and an antenuptial contract
entered into after the engagement and during its pendency must be
attended by the utmost good faith."
The existence of this confidential relationship imposes a strict duty
of fairness upon the prospective husband. Thus in the case of Pierce
v. Pierce,14 the court held ( first paragraph of the syllabus): "While an
antenuptial contract by which the future wife releases all claims against
the estate of her husband ... will be sustained when fairly made, yet,
from the confidential relations between the parties, it will be regarded
with most rigid scrutiny." The same court continued,15 "These authorities go very far in holding that the· courts require strict proof of fairness
when called upon to enforce an antenuptial contract against the wife."
The courts will protect the wife in such cases tm the ground that equity
always protects the weak from the strong and is alert where a fiduciary
relationship is found to exist; and parenthetically, this fiduciary duty
is not a reciprocal one, but one which the husband owes to the wife.16
The courts recognize that a woman is presumed to be subject in such
matters to the influence of her prospective husband and has the right to
Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
Smith v. Smith, 154 Ga. 702, II5 S.E. 73 (1922), where the wife's father
ag~eed that the husband would not be compelled to support child; Slingerland v.
Slingerland, II5 Minn. 270, 132 N.W. 326 (19II).
12 15 Ohio App. 283 at 287, 286 (1921).
18 134 Ohio St. 257 at 264, 16 N.E. (2d) 328 (1938).
14 71 N.Y. 154 (1877).
15 1d. at 158.
16 Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, II7 A. 314 (1922).
10

11
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repose the fullest confidence in him, and, without seeking outside advice, rely on him to deal fairly with her in an agreement of this nature.
She is not dealing with him at arm's length.11
An antenuptial contract must be based upon consideration, which
is generally marriage. As to the wife, however, marriage alone is not
adequate consideration.18 As between the spouses, more consideration
is req1;1ired, such as mutual grants, reciprocal waivers of property rights,
etc.19 It has been held that it is not the promise to marry but the marriage itself that constitutes the consideration in such an agreement. 20
If the contract on its face does not offend public policy and is based
upon some consideration, the courts will next look into the contract in
order to determine whether the contract is fair and just in the light of
surrounding circumstances. In this the courts are very strict.

The Agreement Must be Fair, Just and Adequate in the Light
of Surrounding Circumstances
That the contract be fair, just and adequate is the primary concern
of every court deciding the validity of antenuptial contracts. The reason
is found in the opinion of the Pierce case: 21 "The relationship of parties
who are about to enter into the married state, is one of mutual confidence, and far different from that of those who are dealing with each
other at arms length." All of the early Ohio cases 22 have held that
antenuptial contracts are favored by the courts and will be upheld if
fair and reasonable. The last word of the Ohio Supreme Court, as
expressed in the Juhasz case 23 is as follows:
" ... if the provision for the prospective wife is, in the light of
surrounding circumstances, wholly disproportionate to the means
17

LINpEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 651 (1937).
Welsh v. Welsh, 150 Minn. 23, 184 N.W. 38 (1921); Young v. Hicks, 92
N.Y. 235 (1883); Deller v. Deller, 141 Wis. 255, 124 N.W. 278 (1910). There
are several late cases that have held marriage to be sufficient consideration to uphold an
antenuptial contract where the intention of the wife to waive everything else is clear.
La Liberty v. La Liberty, 127 Cal. App. 669, 16 P. (2d) 681 (1933); Seuss v.
Schukat, 358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934); Geiger v. Merle, 360 Ill. 497, 196 N.E.
497 ( l 93 5). But in all these cases the wife received more than just a marriage certificate. The courts frown upon contracts where the prospective wife waives all her
rights for marriage only.
19
See LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS 667 (1937).
2
° Campbell v. Jeff, 296 Pa. 368, 145 A. 912 (1929).
n Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N.Y. 154 at 158 (1877). See also Rolfe v. Rolfe, 125
Me. 82, 130 A. 877 (1925); Stanger v. Stanger, 152 Minn. 489, 189 N.W. 402
(1922); Re Haberman's Estate, 239 Pa. 10, 86 A. 641 (1912).
22
Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846); Murphy v. Murphy, 12 Ohio St. 407
(1861); Phillips' Exrs. v. Phillips, 14 Ohio St. 308 (1863); Grogan v. Garrison,
27 Ohio St. 50 (1875); Mintier v. Mintier, 28 Ohio St. 307 (1876).
28
Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257 at 264, 16 N.E. (2d) 328 (1938).
18
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of her future husband and to what she would receive under the
law, the bu_rden rests on those claiming the validity of the contract
to show that there was full disclosure of the nature, extent and
value of the intended husband's property, or that she had full
knowledge thereof without such disclosure, and that she, with
this knowledge, voluntarily entered into the antenuptial settlement.... disclosure as a justification or excuse for the disproportionateness is an affirmative defense."
This is generally in accord with the weight of authority.2'
The questions which emanate from these rules are issues of fact as
to what constitutes "wholly disproportionate," "fair and reasonable,"
"surrounding circumstances," "full disclosure," and "full knowledge."
The court in Re Clark's Estate 25 lays down a test of fairness and
adequacy which is stated as follows: ''the true test, as to the adequacy
of the provision in favor of the intended wife, is whether or not it is
sufficient to enable her to live comfortably after his death, in the same
way as ... she had previously lived." This test has, however, seldom
been followed, for the courts of this country will invariably consider
all of the surrounding circumstances and facts of the case. No ironclad
rule can be laid down. A study of the cases indicates, however, that
the courts have taken into consideration generally the estate of the
intended husband and that of the intended wife; 26 the children of each
by a prior marriage; 27 the relative value of the grants and waivers in
24 Watson v. Watson, 104 Kan. 578, 180 P. 242, 182 P. 643 (1919); Pattison
v. Pattison, 129 Kan. 558, 283 P. 483 (1930); Megginson v. Megginson, 367 Ill.
168, 10 N.E. (2d) 815 (1937); Debolt v. Blackburn, 328 Ill. 420, 159 N.E. 790
(1928). These cases differ only in that the courts have held that where the contract
is wholly disproportionate, the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking to uphold the
validity of the contract. In Ohio the burden of proof does not shift but the duty to
show disclosure is only an af!i:rmative defense, which Supreme Court Judge Williams
was emphatic to indicate.
25 Re Clark's Estate, 303 Pa. 538 at 543, 154 A. 919 (1931).
26 Re Enyart's Estate, 100 Neb. 337 at 349, 160 N.W. 120 (1916), where the
court said: "it is to be remembered that the intended wife had no property, and the
intended husband had a great deal of property and had no children"; Warner v.
Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908), where the court held that the financial
condition of the husband only is the test. And see Watson v. Watson, 104 Kan. 578,
180 P. 242, 182 P. 843 (1919); and Mauk's Estate, 19 Pa. Super: 338 (1902).
27 Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E. (2d) 328 (1938); Henry v.
Butler, 87 Kan. 122, 123 P. 742 (1912); In re Uker's Estate, 154 Iowa 428, 134
N.W. 1061 (1912), where the husband had eight children by a prior marriage; also
see Slater v. Slater, 310 Ill. 454, 142 N.E. 177 (1924), where the husband wrote
plaintiff he wanted his children cared for and the wife said she wasn't marrying for
money. Contract upheld even though the wife received nothing under the contract.
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the contract; 28 the state of health and age of the parties; 29 who prepared the agreement and the business experience of each.80
Disclosure
Where it appears on the face of the contract or it is shown by
extrinsic circumstances that the contract is unfair, that is, the provision
for the wife is wholly disproportionate to the means of the intended
husband and to what she would receive under the law, some courts
have said that there is a presumption of fraud, 81 that designed concealment is presumed.82
The e:ffect of showing disproportion is to impose the burden of
proof on those claiming the validity of the contract, to show that there
was a full disclosure to the intended wife of the nature, value and extent of the husband's property or that the wife had independent knowledge thereof,33 and voluntarily signed the agreement.84
28 Taylor v. Taylor, 144111. 436 at 444, 33 N.E. 532 (1893), where the court
said "Having no separate property and the acquisition of none in contemplation, the
surrender of his [ the husband's] rights as to such property is meaningless."
20 Ellis v. Ellis, I Tenn. Ch. App. 198 (1901), where a young girl married an
elderly man; also In re Koeffier's Estate, 215 Wis. u5, 254 N.W. 363 (1934), where
the court held where a wife is not young and love is not the motive for marriage, complete disclosure is unnecessary. It may be noted that Wisconsin courts have always gone
a long way to uphold antenuptial contracts. See Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87
S.W. (2d) 937 (1935), where an So-year-old man married a 54-year-old woman.
Held: marriage was one of convenience.
80 Mines v. Phee, 254 Ill. 60, 98 N.E. 260 (1912), where the contract was
drawn by the defendant's attorney who asked the intended wife to sign, the contract
was set aside as being unfair. Maze's Exrs. v. Maze, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 679, 99 S.W. 336
(1907).
81 Re Maag's Estate, II9 Neb. 237, 228 N.W. 537 (1930). There the court
held that the disproportion was so great as to lead to the conclusion, whether intentional
or otherwise, that it constituted a legal fr_aud. In Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N.Y. I 54
(1877), the court held that in cases of disproportion every presumption is against the
validity of the contract. In Re Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 173 A. 303 (1934),
the court held that constructive fraud existed. The Wisconsin courts have held that
the antenuptial contract is presumed valid if it is fair on its face.
82 Re Waller's Estate, II6 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928), the court, after
finding a gross disproportion between the wife's interest under the contract and the
husband's means, held that the presumption of designed concealment is raised and the
burden of disproving the charge rests on the husband. In Brown v. Brown, 3 29 Ill.
198, 160 N.E. 149 (1928), the court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie
case of fraud by showing the disproportion and the engagement of the parties. Denison
v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 117 A. 314 (1922).
88 Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 264, 16 N.E. (2d) 328 (1938), and cases
cited. The courts are quite unanimous as to the burden of proof. Compare Ray v. Ray's
Ex'x., 249 Ky. 347, 60 S.W. (2d) 935 (1933), where the court held the burden to
be on wife where there was no showing that the wife was without property.
84 The intent of the prospective wife to waive her rights must be unmistakable.
Hardesty v. Hardesty's Exr., 236 Ky. 809, 34 S.W. (2d) 442 (1930), where the
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In the Juhasz case,35 the plaintiff was an illiterate Hungarian woman who was the third wife of the defendant's testator. The plaintiff and
the defendant's testator had entered into an antenuptial agreement
whereby the plaintiff was given "an undivided one-sixth interest in the
Cuyahoga County Real Estate." The court held that as a matter of law
full disclosure was not proven for:
"Although the disclosure as to the nature and amount of
property of the prospective husband was fairly full and complete,
an examination of the evidence shows no mention of the value of
the real estate was ever made to her by him or his attorney. Under
the· rule laid down and sustained by the weight of authority, good
faith requires full disclosure not only as to the nature and amount
of the intended husband's property but also of its value."
The same rule was announced in an earlier Ohio case 86 where the
court said "it was the duty of the dominant party, in the instant case
the intended husband ... to make a full and clear statement of all facts
which related to the subject matter of the contract and which would
fully and completely put his intended wife in the full possession of all
his property rights and interests."
And the courts have generally held that the wife is not bound to
inform herself of the prospective husband's property, for as was said
in Denison v. Dawes,37 "The burden was not upon her to inquire but
upon him to inform." Neither does the fact that the intended wife knew
of the prospective husband's reputation as a prosperous and wealthy
man,38 nor the fact that she lived near the prospective husband,39 relieve
the husband from the duty of fully disclosing to his intended bride the
contract did not recite the waiver of dower. And the wife must not be too much hurried
into it. Re Maag's Estate, 119 Neb. 237, 228 N.W. 537 (1930); White v. White,
II2 Neb. 850, 201 N.W. 662 (1924).
85 134 Ohio St. 257 at 267, 16 N.i. (2d) 328 (1938)~
36 15 Ohio App. 283 at 287 (1921).
• 37 121 Me. 402 at 407, 117 A. 314 (1922). See Re Maag's..Estate, II9 Neb.
237, 228 N.W. 537 (1930), where the executor argued that the intended wife was
charged with the duty of ascertaining the value of the property, and the court held that
such a duty did not exist and approved the Denison v. Dawes case. Also see Mines v.
Phee, 254 Ill. 60, 98 N.E. 260 (1912); Hessick v. Hessick, 169 Ill. 486, 48 N.E.
712 (1897); Re Waller's Estate, 116 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928); In re
Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 173 A. 303 (1934).
38 Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448, 85 N.E. 630 (1908); Hessick v. Hessick,
169 Ill. 486, 48 N.E. 712 (1897); Re Enyar,t's Estate, 100 Neb. 337, 160 N.W. 120
(1916); Stahl v. Stahl, II5 Neb. 882, 215 N.W. 131 (1927).
39 See In re Flannery's Estate, 315 Pa. 576, 173 A. 303 (1934); Murdock v.
Murdock, 219 Ill. 123, 76 N.E. 57 (1905).
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nature, value and extent of his property. As the court said in Warner
'U. Warner,4°
"But even if it is admitted that appellee had been told by
Dr. Warner that he was a 'banker' and 'large land owner' and
'wealthy' ... yet proof of such general facts does not discharge the
_burden which the law casts upon the appellants to show that appellee had such knowledge of the nature, character and value of
Dr. Warner's property as the law requires."
A well-considered case is that of Parker 'U. Gray, 41 wherein the
court said "The fact that testator was a wealthy man and that appellee
lived in his family five years before the contract was made cannot be
said to be sufficient to charge her with knowledge of the extent and
value of his property." Even the signing of a memorandum in the office of the husband's attorney acknowledging that the wife was informed of the nature, extent and value of the intended husband's estate
has been held not binding upon the intended wife. 42
Some courts, however, have held the intended wife chargeable with
knowledge of the extent and value of the prospective husband's property; 48 and where it is apparent that the wife had an understanding of
the terms of the contract and fair knowledge of the intended husband's
property, the courts have not hesitated in holding the contract valid and
binding.44 Neither the reading of the contract by the prospective husband to the prospective wife nor by the intended wife herself, relieves
the former of the duty to disclose. Thus in the case of Murdock 'U.
Murdock,4 5 it was held that although the contract was read in the
presence of the prospective husband and wife and although each paragraph was explained, there was not sufficent disclosure as required by
law.
Many courts have held that it is not sufficient to the validity of
40

235 Ill. 448 at 465, 85 N.E. 630 (1908).
317 Ill. 468 at 476, 148 N.E. 323 (1925).
42
In re Warner's Estate, 207 Pa. St. 580, 57 A. 35 (1904). To the same effect,
see Parker v. Gray, 317 Ill. 468 at 475-476, 148 N.E. 323 (1925), where the court
said "The fact that the contract recites the parties had explained to each other the
amount and value of their respective property is not of itself sufficient to prove full
knowledge on her part."
43
Kuhnen v. Kuhnen, 351 Ill. 591, 184 N.E. 874 (1933); Megginson v.
Megginson, 317 Ill. 168, 10 N.E. (2d) 815 (1937).
44
Re Uker's Estate, 154 Iowa 428, 134 N.W. 1061 (1912); Yockey v. Marion,
269 I11. 342, 110 N.E. 34 (1915).
45
219 Ill. 123, 76 N.E. 57 (1905). To the same effect see Re Enyart's Estate,
100 Neb. 337, 160 N.W. 120 (1916), and Re Maag's Estate, II9 Neb. 237, 228
N.W. 537 (1930). In Re Waller's Estate, u6 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928),
the court held the language too intricate for the layman, hence no disclosure.
41
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antenuptial contracts merely to disclose the nature, value and extent of
the intended husband's property; but good faith requires that the
prospective wife in addition be informed of the value of the estate
which she would receive under the law were there no agreement:16
Good faith requires that the prospective wife be permitted and
given independent advice as to her rights under the antenuptial contract.47 It is often that a prenuptial contract is drawn to defraud tJ:re
wife; however, oftentimes the device of the antenuptial contract is used
to protect the heirs of the husband by a prior marriage. But no matter
how proper the motiv~, the law fully protects the intended wife particularly if she has had no independent advice and advantage is taken
of her ignorance in law matters. So in Pattison v. Pattison,4 8 where Mr.
Pattison sought to protect his children of _a prior marriage by executing
an antenuptial contract with his wife, the court said, "The safe and
certain way to have safeguarded that matter was for Pattison to have
dealt fairly with his affianced bride . . . to have made sure that she
understood what she was doing ... to see to it that [she] had independent advice."
·
Some courts have gone s0 far as to say that a burden is imposed
upon the intended _wife to inquire as to the intended husband's property,49 but these courts failed to appreciate that such a decision does not
take into consideration that any appearance of being mercenary on the·
46 Denison v. Dawes, 121 l'yle. 402 at 406, 117 A. 314 (1922), where the court
said, "It is not enough that she was an intelligent woman. The confidential relations .•. required the plaintiffs to show that she did know ..• not only the nature of
the instrument, but its effect upon her in case she survived her husband." To the
same effect, see Re Enyart's Estate, IOO Neb. 337 at 345, 160 N.W. 120 (1916),
where the court said "the burden rests upon those claiming the validity of the contract
to show that she was aware .•• of the nature, character and value of the estate she was
relinquishing if the marriage took place." Contra: Kingsley v. Noble, 129 Neb. 809,
263 N.W. 222 (1935), where the court held that ignorance of the intended wife's
rights will not entitle her to avoid the contract.
'
47 An early case, Taylor v. Buttrick, 165 Mass. 547, 43 N.E. 507 (1896), held
that an antenuptial contract will not be set aside merely because the wife did not understand the legal effect of the contract where she voluntarily signed and knew its contents.
48 129 Kan. 558 at 562, 28_3 P. 483 (1930). See Maze's Exrs. v. Maze, 30 Ky.
L. Rep. 679, 99 S.W. 336 (1907), where the court required convincing evidence of
lack of fraud because the intended husband, a shrewd businessman, did not afford the
wife an opportunity of loyal counsel. Also see Stanger v. Stanger, 152 Minn. 489, 189
N.W. 402 (1922), where the court said the wife "had no counsel" and was "without
business experience. She was not a match Jor her husband in making such an agreement."
49 Wellington v. Rugg. 243 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 831 (1922), where the court
said that the mere failure of the husband to disclose the amount of property was not
fraud where the intended wife could have made inquiry.
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p~rt of the prospec;tive wife would wreck many marriages and thereby
be contrary to public policy. The parties are not dealing at arm's length
and as the Pennsylvania court said in Morrish v. Morrish,6° "she [ the
wife] cannot be expected to treat her husband as a stranger."
It must be apparent to the student of antenuptial contracts that in
the protection of the prospective wife the courts regard these contracts
with rigid scrutiny and the most important element is a full and complete disclosure of the extent and value of the prospective husband's
property-or in the alternative, clear proof that good faith was manifested and that the intended wife had a full and fair understanding of
the nature, value and extent of said property and some knowledge of
what she was relinquishing under the law. After a thorough study of
the cases one is convinced that the only certain way (if there is a certain
way) to draw up a valid antenuptial contract is: (I) Allow the intended
wife a fair share of the property taking into consideration the means
of the husband. ( 2) Outline in the contract the nature of all the property owned by the husband, its extent and value, or attach a financial
statement.51 (3) Suggest and procure independent advice for the intended wife. ( 4) Have witnesses as to the disclo·sure of the nature,
extent and value of the husband's property.
·
B. Bernard W olson *

50 262 Pa. 192 at 201, 105 A. 83 (1918), quoted in Re Flannery's Estate, 315
Pa. 576 at 579, 173 A. 303 ( 1934) •
51 See Landes v. Landes, 268 Ill. 11, 108 N.E. 691 (1915), where each party
admitted that he had been fully informed as to the nature, extent and value of all the
property of the other and without regard to proportions and in which contract all the
property of both parties was scheduled. The court there held the contract valid. To
the same effect, see Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S.W. (2d) 937 (1935), and
Hockenberry v. Donovan, 170 Mich. 370, 136 N.W. 389 (1912).
* Member of the Toledo, Ohio bar.-Ed.

